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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider a dynamic two-period model with endogenous labor supply and
potential for adverse selection based on private information of individual preferences. We use the
model to draw conclusions about consumption and labor valuation and capital market activity.
Single period models of market activity with heterogeneity in preferences regarding labor
supply show that under private information an important issue of adverse selection arises:
Individuals have an incentive to misrepresent, e.g. Prescott and Townsend (1984), Townsend
(1987) and more recently Bianconi (2001). We introduce intertemporal choice adding a dimension
of consumption smoothing to the intratemporal problem of consumption-work choice. We show
that the introduction of intertemporal choice can have important effects on efficient allocations
and valuations. In our basic framework, there are several units, regions, or countries and potential
differences within and across units. Individuals use capital markets for consumption smoothing
and there are potential differences in the preference for labor supply. We allow trade in lotteries as
a revelation mechanism to avoid adverse selection, and consider allocations with tradable labor
income.
1 We present two main results. First, the introduction of intertemporal choice can mitigate
and/or eliminate adverse selection under private information. Second, the valuation of
consumption and labor and the use of capital markets can vary substantially across different
degrees of heterogeneity and different regimes of unemployment insurance.
This paper is a dynamic extension of Bianconi (2001), who finds that unemployment
insurance regimes matter for asset allocation in a static framework. In the dynamic case,
unemployment insurance matters along with the consumption smoothing problem. Individuals
start with neither borrowing nor lending but use their ability to borrow/lend to smooth
consumption.
2 In the static case under private information, trade in lotteries (contracts) for
employment can mitigate adverse selection providing a classic separating mechanism. In the
                                                          
1 Prescott and Townsend (1984), Townsend (1987), and Bianconi (2001) study the revelation mechanism
used in this paper. A recent related model is Mulligan (2001) for the case of indivisibilities in labor supply,
not adverse selection under private information. Other recent related papers are Gomes et al (2000) and
Alvarez and Veracierto (1999). The paper by Chan and Viceira (2001) presents a model where labor
income is not tradable, and Bodie et al (1992) is an early attempt to study the potential effects of labor
choice on asset allocation.
2 The papers by Gomes et al (2000) and Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) consider the problem of
unemployment insurance and the alternative replacement ratios, e.g. Martin (1996). In this paper, we
examine the polar cases of either 100% replacement (full unemployment insurance) or no replacement (no
unemployment insurance).2
dynamic case, we show that the introduction of trade in another good at another date
(intertemporal choice) can alone mitigate the uneven distribution of consumption and work which
leads to adverse selection under private information. We further examine trade in lotteries
(contracts) for employment in the dynamic case when the parameter space allows adverse
selection to occur.
In our models, the regime regarding unemployment insurance plays an important role in
determining efficient allocations and valuations. The main result is that a regime of full
unemployment insurance implies that individuals use capital markets only moderately. However,
without unemployment insurance capital markets are used more heavily because individuals who
eventually do not work must save to make up for the loss in future output. An earlier paper by
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) discusses the desirability of private saving in the presence of social
insurance mechanisms. Here we find that, for sufficiently high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (high demand for consumption smoothing), private saving due to lack of full
unemployment insurance (incomplete markets) is welfare improving over full unemployment
insurance. However, for other parameter configurations this may not be the case. While authors
such as Mulligan (1991) find negligible quantitative aggregate implications of indivisibilities in
labor supply, we show that intertemporal trade and private information together with alternative
regimes for unemployment insurance can have rather significant effects on allocations and
valuations across units, regions or countries.
In particular, we first show that a necessary and sufficient condition for an uneven distribution
of consumption and work across units to occur, under full information, is that the type with higher
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption and work (or less risk averse in labor
supply) must be a borrower in the first period. This provides an appropriate parameter space for
the study of economies with private information where adverse selection occurs. Then, we
examine schemes of trade in lotteries (contracts) for employment under alternative unemployment
insurance arrangements. Our analysis clearly shows that in countries where unemployment
insurance is generous, capital markets have low use and the risk-free rate of return is low.
However, in countries where unemployment insurance is less generous, capital markets have more
usage and the risk-free rate of return is higher. This is an important hypothesis that requires further
empirical testing.3
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II considers the basic structure while Section III
gives the preliminaries on efficient allocations under full information with homogeneous types.
Section IV examines the alternative models with asymmetric information and alternative markets
structures regarding unemployment insurance. Section V examines the numerical simulation of the
alternative economies while section VI concludes.
II. BASIC STRUCTURE
The model economies of this paper comprise one good and are cast in a dynamic two-period
framework with a finite number of units indexed by j˛￿: j=1,2,…,J. Each unit may be referred as
an island, a region or a country inhabited by a large (countably infinite) number of identical
individuals. A priori there may be no differences within units, but there are potential differences
across units. In the first period, the units have identical endowments, y>0, each consume c1j>0,
and spend the entire time at leisure. Each unit starts with no borrowing and lending, but capital
markets are open for trade in standard one period contracts (bonds). In the second period, the unit
consumes c2j>0 and spends a fraction of the time at work, nj‡0.
A typical unit has a production technology for second period output given by
yj = zj f (nj ) (1)
where yj is the output, per unit of capital, produced by unit j, f is a strictly increasing and strictly
concave function identical for all j ( f’>0 , f”<0), and zj is the total productivity level of the
technology. The differences in productivity across units may be potentially unobservable, however
we assume the existence of an organized asset market that reveals the market-relevant information
of the unit’s productivity as in the recent contribution of Berliant and De (1998). In what follows,
we assume that f (nj ) takes the specific form
 f (nj ) = (nj )
a (2)
for a˛(0,1). Capital markets are perfectly integrated across units, labor is assumed immobile but
labor income is assumed to be tradable, see e.g. Leung (1995), and Chan and Viceira (2000).
The typical unit utility function is given by the function
   W 
j (c1j , c2j , nj ) ”  u (c1j ) + b [ u(c2j ) + v 
j ( nj )]            (3a)
where b˛[0,1) is the subjective discount factor common to all units. The function u is assumed to
be strictly increasing and strictly concave ( u' >0, u''<0 ) and identical across individuals. The
function v is assumed to be strictly decreasing and concave ( v 
j' >0, v 
j''£ 0 ). The intratemporal4
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure may differ across individuals depending
upon the sign of the differential v 
j''£ 0. The main assumption in (3a) is that consumption and
labor are separable in second period utility; in effect as in Mulligan (2001) we assume complete
separation between c and n in utility. As mentioned, the source of private information in this
model will be regarding the sign of the second differential v 
j''£ 0, i.e. the concavity of the utility
function with respect to labor supply in the second period. Throughout the analysis, we assume
preferences of the special form   
W 
j ( c1j , c2j , nj )= (1/1-s) c1j
1-s + b [(1/1-s) c2j
1-s  - d  ( nj 
1+g j) / (1+ gj )],   each j           (3b)
where s˛(0,¥) gives the (common across all, s = 1 indicates logarithmic utility) coefficient of
relative risk aversion with respect to consumption (or the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption across periods), d >0 is a constant reflecting the disutility of labor,
and 0 £ gj gives the curvature of the utility function relative to labor supply. For this utility
function, the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption and leisure (1-n) in the
second period is given by the formula
e 
j( c2j , nj )= - ( c2j
s-1 d nj 
1+g j - 1) / ( c2j
s-1 d  nj 
1+g j + gj ),   each j.           (3c)
which will be evaluated below.
III. EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS: PRELIMINARIES
In the absence of heterogeneity across units and with full information, there is no reason for trade
to occur. The First and Second Fundamental theorems insure that a competitive equilibrium is
Pareto Optimal and that a planner can appropriately find prices and quantities that replicate the
competitive equilibrium. The Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained by maximizing a social
welfare function subject to period-by-period resources constraints, or
          Max  E [ ￿ j  w j  W 
j (c1j , c2j , nj )] (4)
                                     {c1j , c2j , nj}
subject to         ￿j p j c 1j  - y £ 0 (4a)
￿j p j [c 2j - z j  f ( n j ) ] £ 0 (4b)
where wj are arbitrary welfare weights satisfying {wj : wj‡ 0, j=1,2,…,J, ￿ j w j=1}, pj are resource
weights to account for possible differences in size of units satisfying {pj : pj ‡ 0, j=1,2,…,J, ￿ j pj
=1}, and E is the expectations operator.
In this framework, efficiency requires5
q2 /q1 = E [ b u'(c2j )/ u'(c1j )] all j=1,2…J (5a)
where {q1,q2}‡ 0 are Lagrange multipliers attached to the resources constraints, i.e. the expected
marginal rate of substitution in consumption across periods equals the marginal rate of
transformation in the capital market expressed as the relative price of consumption across periods.
Note from expression (5a) that the growth in consumption is identical across all j=1,2,...J, the
usual full "risk sharing" characteristic of frictionless economies. Labor/leisure choice in the
second period yields
E [v 
j'( nj ) + u'(c2j ) zj f '( nj )] = 0 all j=1,2…J (5b)
i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and work in utility is equal to the
marginal rate of transformation in production for the second period. The two constraints (4a,b)
hold with equality and we obtain solutions for {c1j ,c2j ,nj ,q1,q2} as a function of technology and
preference parameters. In this case, if wj=pj=1/J all j, zj=z all j, then c1j=c1, c2j=c2, nj=n all j, the
perfectly pooled equilibrium: All market participants are identical and there is no reason to engage
in trade across units, regions or countries.
Consider next the case of heterogeneity in preference towards labor across units, but full
information, i.e. the heterogeneity is public information. Each unit has only one type and
differences across units reflect differences across types. There are gains from trade in this case.
The Pareto efficient allocation is obtained by maximizing the social welfare function subject to the
resources constraints as in (4) yielding Pareto efficiency as in (5a)-(5b).
For example, let there be two units or types J=2, with identical weights wj=pj, identical
productivity zj= z all j, and preference structure [recall (3b)]
   •  j=a:   v
a''( na ) = 0  ￿  ga= 0 (6)
•  j=b:   v
b''( nb )<0 ￿  g b> 0.
For type j=a preference is linear in labor supply and for type j=b it is strictly concave in labor
supply. This difference in preferences implies that, ceteris paribus, for type j=a, the elasticity of
intratemporal substitution between consumption and leisure is larger than for type j=b, e.g. (3c).
In particular, the linearity in labor supply implies that j=a is ‘risk neutral’ in labor supply whereas
the strict concavity for  j=b implies ‘risk aversion’ in labor supply. The strict concavity with
respect to consumption imply that both demand consumption smoothing, i.e. both are risk averse
in consumption. In terms of labor supply, the more risk averse individual, v
b''( nb )<0 , will prefer
to work more hours instead of facing a gamble that would give average disutility; whereas the risk6
neutral type, v
a''( na )=0, will be indifferent between the certain and the gamble. Hence, for the
risk neutral individual, the disutility of labor is proportional and the individual is more sensitive to
changes in labor supply in terms of its utility costs. For the risk averse individual, the disutility of
labor is less than proportional and she is less sensitive to variation in labor supply in terms of its
utility costs.
The introduction of heterogeneity has important implications for efficient allocations. To see
this, first, consider a framework without the choice of first period consumption (c1j) as in Bianconi
(2001). In this special case, there is no possibility of intertemporal trade but, given the preference
structure (6), individuals engage in intratemporal trade to negotiate differences in preference
towards labor supply. The efficient allocation across units takes the form
c1j = y,   all j; c2j = c2,   all j; na < nb. (7)
In this intratemporal allocation, both consume the same amount in the second period, but
individual j=b, which is risk averse in labor supply, works more.
The introduction of intertemporal trade, through the availability of another good at another
date, has a nontrivial effect on the efficient allocation across units and has the potential to mitigate
and/or eliminate the uneven allocation obtained in (7). We present below conditions under which
the uneven allocation of expression (7) is preserved in the presence of both intratemporal and
intertemporal trading opportunities.
Proposition 1: A sufficient and necessary condition for an allocation with na< nb to occur, under
technology (2), preference structure (6) and no sources of risk, is that c1a>c1b or c2a>c2b, i.e. the
individual less risk averse in labor supply, j=a, must be a borrower in the first period.
The proof is simple. Capital market efficiency (5a) implies u'(c1a )/u'(c1b )=u'(c2a )/u'(c2b ). Hence,
if
c1a ￿ c1b ￿ c2a ￿ c2b￿ u'(c1a )/u'(c1b ) ￿ 1￿ c2a ￿ c2b￿ u'(c2a )/u'(c2b ) ￿ 1. (8)
From the labor/leisure margin (5b),
v 
a'( na ) + u'(c2a ) z f '( na ) = v 
b'( nb ) + u'(c2b ) z f '( nb ) ￿
v 
a'( na ) - v 
b'( nb ) = z [u'( c2b ) f '( nb ) - u'( c2a ) f '( na )] < 0
where the inequality follows from the preference structure (6), and thus follows
u'( c2a ) / u'( c2b ) > f '( nb ) / f '( na ). (9)7
From (8), c1a > c1b or c2a > c2b ￿ u'( c2a )/u'( c2b )<1 which from (9) implies f '( nb )< f '( na ), or nb
> n a .When c1a > c 1b or c 2a > c 2b, resources constraints (4a,b) require individual j=a to be a
borrower.￿
Ultimately, for Proposition 1 to be satisfied and for na < nb to occur in the presence of both
intratemporal and intertemporal trade, the parameter space must be such that the individual less
risk averse in labor supply chooses to borrow in the first period. Under preference structure (6),
the condition is that the risk neutral individual j=a must consume more than her endowment in the
first period, and thus work less in the second period. The risk averse individual j=b must save in
the first period and work more in the second period.
As an example, consider the following parameter configuration:
{w j=p j= ½, a=0.6, b=0.95, d=2.5, ga=0, gb=0.75,s =1.25, y=1, z=2.534}.
This parameter set yields an efficient allocation:
{c1a=1.456, c1b=0.544, c2a=1.977, c2b=0.739, na=0.034, nb=0.902, ya=0.335, yb=2.381}.
Individual j=a works and produces less, consumes more in both periods, and borrows in the first
period (c1a=1.456>y=1), all relative to individual j=b. We provide a brief sensitivity analysis by
changing the parameter governing intertemporal substitution, (1/ ) s increases to 2  indicating
lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution and lower demand for consumption smoothing for
both individuals, all other parameters remain the same:
{w j=p j= ½, a=0.6, b=0.95, d=2.5, ga=0, gb=0.75,s =2, y=1, z=2.534}.
This alternative parameter set yields an efficient allocation:
{c1a=1.081, c1b=0.919, c2a=1.279, c2b=1.087, na=0.084, nb=0.561, ya=0.574, yb=1.792}.
The result relative to the case where  s =1.25 is clear. The uneven distribution of work and
consumption diminishes considerably, indicating that an increase in s can mitigate the uneven
distribution, i.e. a lower demand for consumption smoothing by both types can mitigate (and even
reverse) the uneven distribution of consumption and work across individuals.
To sum, the presence of capital markets under heterogeneity in preferences towards labor
supply can plausibly mitigate and/or eliminate the uneven distribution of consumption and work.
Under a parameter space that satisfies Proposition 1, we obtain uneven distributions of
consumption and work, but other sectors of the parameter space can easily eliminate it. In what
follows, we assume that the parameter space is such that the uneven distribution initially occurs.8
IV.  HETEROGENEITY, ADVERSE SELECTION, EFFICIENCY AND MARKET
COMPLETENESS
We now proceed examining alternative cases relating to the information structure about potential
differences in preferences, market regimes of unemployment insurance and the effects of open
intertemporal capital markets on efficient allocations and valuations, under conditions satisfying
Proposition 1.
IV.1 Private Information in Individual Preferences with Heterogeneous Types: Full
Unemployment Insurance
We introduce private information into the previous model under conditions satisfying Proposition
1. In this case, individual differences across units are private information of the specific unit and
there may be differences in allocation ex-ante versus ex-post. A feasible and implementable
allocation requires incentive compatibility constraints of the form
W 
j (c1j , c2j , nj ) ‡  W 
j (c1i ,c2i , ni ) for all  j,i˛￿, i„j (10)
i.e. individual of unit  j when faced with alternative consumption-labor supply bundles in the
second period will have an incentive to reveal her type truthfully, and she will have an incentive
not to misrepresent her preferences towards labor. Under conditions that satisfy Proposition 1,
with private information, the model in section III is such that the incentive compatibility
constraints will be violated ex-ante because type j=a consumes more and works less while type
j=b works more and consumes less. Therefore, under private information, type j=b will have an
incentive to misrepresent as type j=a, and enjoy less work and more consumption. This is a classic
adverse selection problem, e.g. Akerlof (1970). Technically, for utility  u strictly concave in
consumption, the consumption-labor supply possibility set is not convex, e.g. Prescott and
Townsend (1984).
3
The revelation mechanism used here to avoid the adverse selection problem is to introduce a
lottery scheme that convexifies the consumption-labor supply possibilities set.
4 Denoting the
                                                          
3 The strict concavity of u is crucial for the non-convexity to arise. If u were to be linear, no differences in
labor supply would occur and convexity would not be compromised. The lottery scheme presented below is
based on Prescott and Townsend (1984), and other applications of lotteries may be found in Rogerson
(1988), Besley et al (1994), Bianconi (2001). For a comprehensive exposition of general equilibrium with
lotteries, see Townsend (1987).
4 In areas of the parameter space where Proposition 1 is not satisfied, the lottery mechanisms studied in
what follows would still be valid under the assumption of indivisibilities in the labor market as in the paper
by Mulligan (2001); see e.g. Hornstein and Prescott (1989) for a review of indivisibilities and lotteries.9
consumption-labor supply bundles (c,n)˛￿, where ￿ is the consumption-labor possibility set, the
analogous to the incentive compatibility constraints (10) with the introduction of the lottery
scheme are
        ￿ (c,n)˛￿  fj ( c , n ) W 
j (  c , n ) ‡ ￿ (c,n)˛￿  fi ( c , n ) W 
j (  c , n )   for all j,i˛￿, i„j (11)
where fj (c,n) ‡ 0, ￿j fj (c,n)=1. Hence, f is the lottery for bundle the consumption-labor (c,n).
The incentive compatibility constraints in (11) are linear in the lottery and yield a convex
consumption-labor possibility set. A consequence of introducing the revelation mechanism
through the lottery scheme is that ex-ante and ex-post allocations may differ. Ex-ante, all
individuals in all units are identical in expectations but ex-post the relevant differences are
realized.
Consider again two units J=2, with wj=pj, and preference structure as in (6). The revelation
mechanism consists of introducing a lottery in the labor supply of individuals of unit j=a to make
it unattractive to individuals of unit j=b who are risk averse, while not affecting the decisions of
j=a who are risk neutral. Let the lottery for j=a be a contract with the firm with the following
terms:
•  with probability (1- f ):  na = 0;
•  with probability f:  na = n>0;
•  f gives full unemployment insurance to the holder;
for f˛(0,1), and n>0 given. The lottery ticket gives every holder full unemployment insurance,
thus there are complete markets in unemployment insurance.
5 The effective hours worked will be
f· n and every individual of unit j=a will receive ex-post a full wage za f’(f n ) whether working
or not. This presumes that markets provide full insurance at actuarially fair prices, e.g. Marcet et al
(1998).
The expected utility for j=a, ex-ante, is W 
a ( c1a , c2a , f n ) and j=a maximizes expected
utility by choice of probability f. Ex-ante allocations can be obtained as solutions to the social
problem
6
                                                          
5 We do not consider any potential moral hazard problem relating to the work effort in the presence of full
insurance here. The papers by Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Atkeson and Lucas (1995) present
models where the moral hazard problem in unemployment insurance is fully analyzed.
6 The validity of the First and Second Fundamental Theorems for the economies with lotteries and private
information used in this paper are studied in detail in Prescott and Townsend (1984), hence not discussed
here.10
Max { w a  W 
a (c1a , c2a , f n ) + w b  W 
b (c1b , c2b , nb )} (12)
                 { c1a , c2a , c1b , c2b  , f , nb }
subject to
￿j p j c 1j  - y £ 0           (12a)
     p a [c 2a  -  z a  f (f n ) ] + p b [c 2b  - z b  f ( n b ) ]£ 0           (12b)
where in the second period resources constraint, f enters as the proportion of individuals of unit
j=a who actually work. Note that the social planner knows the location of individuals across units,
but due to private information must give individuals the right incentive to reveal truthfully. Hence,
the contract is offered to all across units, and gives the right incentive for all in each unit to reveal
truthfully. In effect, there is no a priori intra-unit differences, and, ex-ante, no inter-unit
differences as well. However, ex-post both intra-unit and inter-unit differences will arise. A
solution to (12) yields Pareto efficiency ex-ante for all units, or
q2 /q1= E [ b u'(c2j )/ u'(c1j )]         all j=a,b                    (13a)
where, as before, {q1 ,q2 ‡ 0} are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the resources constraints;
and
E [v 
a'(f n ) + u'(c2a ) za f '(f n  )] = 0           (13b)
             E [v 
b'( nb ) + u'(c2b ) zb f '( nb )] = 0.           (13c)
Indeed, this ex-ante allocation is identical to the full information allocation with heterogeneity in
section III when we set
na = f n.           (13d)
Hence, ex-ante Pareto efficiency holds and the lottery makes everyone better off in expectations.
The ex-post allocation in this case is also efficient. The individuals in unit j=a are subdivided into
the fraction (1-f) who do not work, but due to the complete markets in unemployment insurance
receive a full wage zaf’(f n ), and the fraction f that work n hours receiving the same wage
zaf’(fn).
Because of the linearity of the utility function of all j=a in f (risk neutrality), and separability
between consumption and labor, we have that
        v
a' ( f n ) = v
a'( 0 ) = constant (14)
i.e. independent of f n ex-post. Thus, efficiency ex-post holds for all j=a, that is
 E [v 
a'(f n ) + u'(c2a ) za f '(f n  )] = E [v 
a'( 0 ) + u'(c2a ) za f '(f n  )] = 0. (15)11
For all j=b, efficiency holds as well, e.g. expression (5b). To sum, for v
1''( na )=0, v
b''( nb )<0,
separable utility between consumption and labor, and private information, ex-ante efficiency is
consistent with ex-post efficiency with lotteries as a revelation mechanism.
However, differences in risk aversion towards labor in preferences matter for ex-post
efficiency. Consider the model above with a slight modification in the preferences described in
(6), within the parameter space that satisfies Proposition 1. Let v
b''(nb ) < v
a''( na )<0. Therefore,
individuals in unit j=a are uniformly less risk averse than j=b or similarly have a uniformly higher
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption and leisure. The only difference from
above is that now both types are risk averse. Individual preferences are private information and the
revelation mechanism is identical: introduce a lottery for j=a to make it unattractive for j=b, the
more risk averse, while acceptable to j=a, the less risk averse. The important issue here is the
difference across units not the specific risk neutrality versus risk aversion per se.
For small risk aversion in labor supply of j=a, ex-ante Pareto Efficiency holds in this case as
well: for all of j=a, ex-ante expression (13a) holds and for all of j=b ex-ante expression (13b)
holds. However, ex-post allocations may not be the same. The individuals in unit  j=a are
subdivided into the fraction  (1-f) who do not work, but due to the complete markets in
unemployment insurance receive a full wage za f’(f n ), and the fraction f  that work n hours and
receive the same wage za f’(f n ). Now, both are risk averse implying that
       v
a'( f n ) „  v
a' ( 0 ) (16)
ex-post, since, the marginal rate of substitution is a function of the labor supply when all are risk
averse. For the proportion (1-f) of individuals in unit j=a who do not work, there will be ex-post
inefficiency, or
  E [v 
a'( 0 ) + u'(c2a ) za f '(f n  )] „ 0. (17)
For the proportion f of individuals in unit j=a who do work, there is ex-post efficiency, or
E [v 
a'(f n ) + u'(c2a ) za f '(f n  )] =0. (18)
For all of j=b, there is ex-post efficiency as in (5b). Thus, ex-ante efficiency is consistent with ex-
post inefficiency at least for some in the population of j=a.
IV.2 Private Information in Individual Preferences with Heterogeneous Types: No Unemployment
Insurance
In the cases of section IV.1, we assumed that there are complete markets for unemployment
insurance so that a lottery holder can receive full wage in case of unemployment. As mentioned,12
this presumes that markets provide full insurance at actuarially fair prices. In this section, we
assume that there are no insurance mechanisms available for j=a, i.e. there are incomplete markets
in unemployment insurance. The individuals of unit j=a are faced with idiosyncratic risk and use
the capital market to insure against it.
We apply the same revelation mechanism except that the lottery contract specifies that the
individual who does not work ex-post will not receive a payment; i.e. the terms of the contract are
•  with probability (1- f ):  na = 0;
•  with probability f:   na = n>0;
•  f gives no unemployment insurance to the holder.
In this case, ex-ante efficiency holds exactly as before, i.e. Pareto efficiency ex-ante (in
expectations) holds, but ex-post allocations are inefficient and different from the cases in section
IV.1 above.
Once the lottery is revealed, the fraction (1-f) of individuals in unit j=a who do not work will
not be able to consume the same amount as the other fraction f ex-post, since, with incomplete
markets, they receive nothing in terms of wages in the second period, and have no labor income to
trade. Therefore, the fraction (1-f) consumes out of the first period endowment and the fraction f
consumes more ex-post, or
c2a,f = c2a,1-f, full unemployment insurance  / f > c2a,1-f, full unemployment insurance.
Thus, in the case of incomplete markets for unemployment insurance there is ex-ante efficiency as
before but there is ex-post inefficiency for some of j=a. The nature of the inefficiency includes the
one discussed in expression (17) relating to the marginal disutility of labor, and in addition, it
includes inefficiency in the marginal utility of consumption, since we obtain ex-post u
a' (c2a,f )„
u
a' (c2a,1-f ), i.e. consumption for all individuals in unit j=a is not going to be identical ex-post.
This implies that individuals use the capital market in different degrees.
We proceed to examine the implications of the different regimes of unemployment insurance
and their effects on allocations, valuation and welfare.
V.  ALLOCATIONS, VALUATION AND WELFARE WITH ALTERNATIVE REGIMES
We consider the effects of the alternative private information and unemployment insurance
schemes on the valuation of consumption, work, and on the risk-free asset in the economy. The13
risk-free valuation of $1 of saving in the first period is determined by expressions (5a) and (13a),
where
   R = 1 / E[b u'(c2j )/ u'(c1j )]                     (19a)
gives the risk-free gross return on saving, denoted R, and saving is defined as
sj ” y - c1j  each j.                                 (19b)
The valuation of one unit of work in the first period is determined, from (5a,b), by
E [{b u'(c2j )/ u'(c1j )} zj f '( nj )] = E [ - b v 
j'( nj )/ u'(c1j )] ” plj all j          (19c)
where the right-hand side denotes the price of one unit of labor next period,  plj. Equations
(19a,b,c) are the main relationships that represent the asset valuation across units. For each case
examined in sections III-IV regarding the nature of private information and market completeness
of unemployment insurance, the set of efficiency relationships can be evaluated and comparisons
across the different regimes governing private information and market completeness can be drawn.
We pursue a quantitative approach in drawing the comparisons.
7 Allocations and valuations
are computed with J=2, w j=p j= ½ and zj=2.534 for j=a,b as in Table 1. At the benchmark set of
Table 1, we use the plausible parameter choices seen in section III, that is
{ a = 0.6, b = 0.95, d = 2.5, g b= {0.75,0.25}, s = {2,1.25}, y=1, n=0.6 }.
As noted above, Table 1 presents results for the basic set of parameter values. The first
column is the basic economy in section III where there is heterogeneity in risk aversion to labor
supply by individuals j=b , g b=0.75, but full information. Individuals j=a, are risk neutral in labor
supply so work less and consume more in the first period thus borrowing more against future
income. Individuals j=b are risk averse in labor supply so work more and consume less in the first
period thus lending to individuals  j=a. Individuals  j=a have a much higher elasticity of
intratemporal substitution. The capital movement across units is small, of the order of one seventh
of individual j=a output and more than one twentieth of individual j=b output. The market price of
labor, according to the right-hand side of (19c), is also higher for j=a. The marginal rates of
substitution are identical by the capital market participation in (19a). The welfare of j=a is higher
due to the higher consumption profile and lower work hours. Given the technology (2), we can
infer from Table 1 that the return to fixed capital is higher for j=b since she works more and has a
                                                          
7 Analytical comparisons are infeasible in this framework, see e.g. Leung (1995) for a case without private
information where analytical results can be drawn.14
smaller residual while the reverse is observed for j=a. Since j=a works less, her wage rate is much
higher relative to j=b.
The second and third columns provide sensitivity analysis. The second column is the case
where the parameter governing intertemporal substitution, ( 1/  )  s, decreases from  2 to  1.25,
indicating an increase in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The third column provides
sensitivity to a change in the parameter governing the risk aversion in labor supply of individual
j=b, gb decreases to 0.25 indicating lower risk aversion for individual j=b. The result relative to
the first column is that the elasticity of intratemporal substitution of both individuals increase. Due
to the nonlinearities in the model, the smaller the discrepancy in preferences towards labor supply
when j=a is risk neutral, the larger is the extent of the uneven distribution of consumption and
work across individuals.
In general, the sensitivity analysis in the second and third columns indicates that higher
elasticity of intratemporal substitution for the risk neutral type j=a increases her consumption
profile. For the risk averse individual j=b it decreases her consumption profile, making her work
more. At the same time, it increases the volume of saving. Because j=b works slightly more, its
own return to fixed capital increases, and the wage rate and price of labor decrease. In the case of
a decrease in s or higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution (second column), there is more
capital market activity (volume of savings increases) and the marginal rate of substitution
decreases indicating an increase in the risk-free rate of return. For gb=0.25 (third column) the
marginal rate of substitution is not significantly changed. Welfare improves substantially for all in
the second column with higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution and more demand for
consumption smoothing. However, welfare deteriorates for j=b in the case of her own lower risk
aversion (third column) while improving slightly for j=a.
The private information economy examined in section IV.1 is the one where there is
heterogeneity in risk aversion to labor supply by individuals j=b, g  b=0.75, risk neutrality for
individuals  j=a,  ga=0, and there is full unemployment insurance. The lottery contract makes
individuals reveal truthfully and the allocations ex-ante and ex-post are identical to the economy
with full information in Table 1 because full unemployment insurance allows all to smooth
consumption identically regardless of working or not working in the second period. In the first
column, the effective labor supply of the fraction f of individuals j=a who work is fn=0.084,
identical to the labor supply in the full information economy and the lottery is f=0.140. Similarly,15
in the second column the lottery is f=0.057, and in the third column it is f=0.068. The only
difference is in the welfare of the fraction of individuals j=a who do not work, because ex-post
they derive no disutility of labor and consume the same amount, thus welfare is higher for that
share, (1-f) of the population j=a who do not work.
The more important results are observed in Table 2, the ex-post allocation of the economy of
section IV.2, where the market regime is of no unemployment insurance. The ex-ante allocation
would be identical to Table 1, section IV.1, however once the lottery is revealed, the table shows
an ex-post allocation radically different due to several inefficiencies. In the first column, we note
the fraction f of j=a who work: They consume more in both periods than the fraction (1-f) that
does not work. However, all individuals j=a become lenders in this allocation. The fraction (1-f)
cannot consume out of second period output so it must use the capital market to save out of the
first period endowment. The proportion f that works consumes more than the proportion (1-f), but
saves in the first period as well. As a result, individual j=b is better off since it works less and
consumes more through borrowing in the first period. In this case, the trade in lotteries together
with open intertemporal capital markets completely eliminate adverse selection. Relative to the
full unemployment insurance regime (Table 1, first column), the volume of saving increases
substantially for the fraction (1-f) of type j=a, to about one third of the output produced. In this
allocation, the fraction f that actually works is much higher relative to the full unemployment
insurance case. Hence, the average price of labor is much lower relative to the full insurance case,
even though it is higher for type j=b because she works less.
The marginal rates of substitution are not identical across agents anymore because there are
different degrees of capital market participation, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution of j=a is
lower than j=b, i.e. lack of full "risk sharing" due to private information. However, the key result
is that, relative to the full unemployment insurance case, the marginal rate of substitution is lower
across all units implying that the risk-free rate is higher in the economy without unemployment
insurance, both for each group and on average across groups. The welfare of j=b is higher due to
the higher consumption profile and lower work hours.
The second and third columns of Table 2 present sensitivity regarding s and g b as in Table 1.
The general effect is as before. We note an increase in the elasticity of intratemporal substitution
of all types. Since now the types j=b are borrowers, the second column shows that their own
consumption increases. The volume of capital market activity in the saving row also increases and16
the marginal rates of substitution decrease further showing a further rise in the risk-free rate of
return.
The welfare results in the second column reveal that, in economies with high elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (high demand for consumption smoothing), aggregate welfare is slightly
larger than in economies without unemployment insurance. In particular, all j=a are worse off, but
all j=b are better off bringing the average across groups slightly up. All other cases are consistent
with the previous results of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) who have shown cases where it may be
desirable to prevent private saving in favor of social insurance mechanisms. However, we show
that that private saving is welfare improving relative to full unemployment insurance, at least in
the case of high elasticity of intertemporal substitution (high demand for consumption smoothing).
The third column, where risk aversion of  j=b  decreases, shows a slight increase in the
consumption pattern of j=b and lower labor supply relative to the first column. In all cases adverse
selection is fully mitigated.
The resulting comparison between an economy with full unemployment insurance and no
unemployment insurance (Tables 1 and 2) yields very sharp results regarding capital markets
usage and returns. In economies with full unemployment insurance, capital markets work less
towards mitigating and/or eliminating adverse selection due to private information in preferences
regarding labor supply. This is because there is less demand for use of capital markets given that a
lottery ticket holder knows that she will be receiving full salary whether working or not. In those
economies the risk-free rate of return is lower. However, in economies with less than full
unemployment insurance, or no unemployment insurance as in the example above, capital markets
work much more towards mitigating and/or eliminating adverse selection due to private
information in preferences regarding labor supply. In this case, there is much more demand for use
of capital markets given that a lottery ticket holder knows that she will not be receiving full salary
when the outcome is negative. Consequently, in those economies the risk-free rate of return is
higher relative to the full unemployment insurance economy. This is a sharp hypothesis that can
be, and should be tested with real world data. Countries with more generous unemployment
insurance, for example Spain, should have lower use of capital markets and low risk-free returns
whereas countries with less generous unemployment insurance, for example the U.S., should have
more use of capital markets and a higher risk-free return.17
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We examined the effects of the presence of intertemporal capital markets in economies with
private information regarding preferences towards labor supply. The introduction of another good
at another date in an otherwise single period economy can have important effects on allocations
and valuations. We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for an uneven distribution of
consumption and work to occur under full information is that the type less risk averse towards
labor supply must be a borrower in the first period. Then, we proceed to show that ex-post
inefficiency can be consistent with ex-ante efficiency and analyze allocations under alternative
regimes of unemployment insurance. The main result is that the presence of capital markets can
mitigate and/or reverse adverse selection based on heterogeneity in preferences towards labor
supply, but this is particularly sensitive to the degree of unemployment insurance available for
market participants. Our results suggest that in countries where unemployment insurance is
generous capital markets have low usage and the risk-free rate of return is low. However, in
countries where unemployment insurance is less generous, capital markets have more usage and
the risk-free rate of return is higher. This is an important hypothesis that requires further empirical
testing.
Earlier  analytical work by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) shows cases where it may be
desirable to prevent private saving in favor of social insurance mechanisms. Our result is that
generous unemployment insurance benefits could pose a barrier to private saving, thus affecting
allocation and valuation. For example, we find that in the case of high intertemporal substitution
(high consumption smoothing demand), aggregate welfare is larger in the economy without
unemployment insurance than in the economy with unemployment insurance, thus indicating a
potential benefit of private saving. More recently, Mulligan (1991) finds negligible quantitative
aggregate implications of indivisibilities in labor supply. However, we show here that
heterogeneity with private information together with alternative regimes for unemployment
insurance can have rather important effects on allocations and valuation of assets across units,
regions or countries.
Further research in the direction of introduction of real investment or the explicit
consideration of moral hazard seems all worth pursuing.18
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Table 1: Efficient Allocation and Valuation with Intertemporal Trade under Full Information







c1a 1.081 1.456 1.249
c1b 0.919 0.544 0.750
c2a 1.279 1.977 1.478
c2b 1.087 0.739 0.888
na 0.084 0.034 0.041
nb 0.561 0.902 0.671
sa -0.081 -0.456 -0.249
sb 0.081 0.456 0.249
ya 0.574 0.335 0.372
yb 1.792 2.381 1.994
e 
a 2.713 8.848 5.621
e 
b 0.006 0.348 0.217
E[plj] 2.038 2.413 2.468
pla, 2.776 3.799 3.708
plb 1.300 1.027 1.211
R=1/E[mrj] 1.473 1.543 1.473
Ra 1.473 1.543 1.473
Rb 1.473 1.543 1.473
E[mrj] 0.679 0.648 0.679
mra 0.679 0.648 0.679
mrb 0.679 0.648 0.679
W -2.162 -1.095 -2.548
W a -1.868 -0.509 -1.540
W b -2.456 -1.680 -3.55621
Table 2: Ex-post Allocation and Valuation with Intertemporal Trade and without
Unemployment Insurance







c1a,f 0.763 0.591 0.708
c1a,1-f 0.509 0.475 0.600
c2a,f 0.937 0.848 0.893
c2a,1-f 0.625 0.682 0.756
c1b 1.321 1.432 1.309
c2b 1.571 1.913 1.464
na 0.400* 0.482* 0.508*
f 0.667 0.804 0.846
nb 0.296 0.321 0.144
sa,f 0.237 0.409 0.292
sa,1-f 0.491 0.525 0.401
sb -0.321 -0.432 -0.309
ya 1.423 1.636 1.687
yb 1.220 1.280 0.792
e 
a
(f) 0.067 0.136 0.118
e 
b 0.439 0.520 1.175
E[plj] 1.523 1.408 1.849
pla,(f) 1.383 1.230 1.191
plb 1.663 1.585 2.506
R=1/E[mrj] 1.536 1.580 1.475
Ra,(f) 1.587 1.656 1.675
Rb 1.488 1.513 1.317
E[mrj] 0.651 0.633 0.678
mra,(f) 0.630 0.604 0.597
mrb 0.672 0.661 0.759
W -2.433 -1.037 -2.573
W a,f -3.275 -1.678 -3.681
W a,1-f -3.485 -0.563 -2.927
W b -1.522 -0.616 -1.581
Note: * Effective labor supply, fn. 
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